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The Involuntary Dismissal Sanction for Rule 8(a)(2) Violations
in Malpractice Complaints-A Reversion to Code
Pleadings?
In Harris v. MareadyI the North Carolina Court of Appeals effectively
established a mandatory rule that dismissal with prejudice under rule 41(b) 2 is
the proper sanction for violation of rule 8(a)(2)'s 3 restriction on ad damnum

clauses in professional malpractice actions. The Harriscourt reached this result by extending the court of appeals' holding in Jones v. Boyce. 4 In Jones the

court had upheld the dismissal of a legal malpractice suit even though plaintiff
was a prison inmate appearingpro se who had filed a timely motion to amend
his complaint5 under rule 15(a). 6 Harris solidified this reversion to code-like

pleading and created, in effect, a per se rule regarding sanctions for such
8(a)(2) errors. The court of appeals held that the trial court's refusal to dismiss

7
plaintiff's legal malpractice action with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.

The court therefore reversed the trial court's ruling and dismissed the suit with
1. 64 N.C. App. 1,306 S.E.2d 799 (1983) (notice of appeal filed Oct. 21, 1983; case argued to
the North Carolina Supreme Court Feb. 13, 1984). After this note was sent to press, the North
Carolina Supreme Court, on August 28, 1984, reversed the court of appeals' holding in Harris v.
Maready. The court held that a case in which the complaint violates rule 8(a)(2) should be dismissed only "when less drastic sanctions will not suffice." The supreme court identified "lesser
sanctions" as including fines, reprimands, and the striking of the offending portions of the
complaint.
2. N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(b) states:
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof-Forfailure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
an action or of any claim therein against him. . . . Unless the court in its order for
dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this section ... operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
3. N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) states:
(a) Claimsforrelief-a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief.
shall contain
(2) A demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled ....
Provided, however, in all professional malpractice actions. . . , wherein the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), the pleading
shall not state the demand for monetary relief, but shall state that the relief demanded is
for damages incurred or to be incurred in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) ....
4. 60 N.C. App. 585, 299 S.E.2d 298 (1983).
5. See id. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300; see Record at 10, Jones. Jones filed his motion to
amend Oct. 1, 1981, 21 days after Boyce filed his 41(b) motion to dismiss. See Record at 6-7,
Jones.
6. N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a) states:
(a) Amendments-A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of course at
any time before a responsive pleading is served ....
Otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires.
7. Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808. The Harris court upheld the lower court's
dismissal for plaintiff's failure to comply with proper service of process. The complaint served
"was not addressed to the partnership but was issued to 'Petree, Stockton, Robinson, Vaughn,
Glaze & Maready, P.A.'" Id. at 8, 306 S.E.2d at 803. The court of appeals held that process
therefore was served on a nonexistent corporation, id., and defendant would be prejudiced if the
court allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint to drop the "P.A." from her complaint so as to
bring in properly the partnership as a defendant after the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 12,
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prejudice." Thus, Jones and Harris create a Draconian pleading trap for the

unwary, unversed and inept.
Plaintiff in Jones was tried and convicted of the first degree murder 9 of

his brother and subsequently filed a legal malpractice suit against his trial attorney. 10 Appearing pro se, Jones included a prayer for damages totalling
$3,000,000 in his complaint." After defendant filed an answer denying the
2
allegations, plaintiff immediately sought leave of court under rule 15(a)' to
amend his ad damnum clause. The trial judge denied the motion to amend
and granted defendant's
motion to dismiss with prejudice.' 3 The court of ap14
peals affirmed.
Harris involved a legal malpractice claim that arose out of an alleged
conflict of interest.' 5 The complaint demanded compensatory damages of ten
306 S.E.2d at 806. Judge Arnold dissented as to this finding. Id. at 17, 306 S.E.2d at 808 (Arnold,
J., dissenting).
Defendant Maready also was served incorrectly with process; he received a summons intended for plaintiff's former husband. "Delayed service of complaint on Maready was by certified mail, delivery to addressee only, signed for by 'Bonnie Lawson, authorized agent.' "Id. at 1213, 306 S.E.2d at 806. No summons directed to defendant Maready ever was served upon him.
Id. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that, as against Maready, the suit should
be dismissed for invalid service of process. Id. at 14, 306 S.E.2d at 807.
8. Id. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808. Judge Webb dissented as to the holding of abuse of discretion. Id. (Webb, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The court of appeals reinforced its
holding in Harris in a third 1983 decision, Schell v. Coleman, 65 N.C. App. 91, 308 S.E.2d 662
(1983). Schell involved an action for legal malpractice in which plaintiff's attorney sought nearly
$2,000,000 in damages. This specific prayer for reliefviolated rule 8(a)(2). Id. at 91, 308 S.E.2d at
663. The court of appeals reversed, specifically relying on Jones and Harris, holding that it was an
abuse of discretion to order plaintiff to correct his complaint rather than to dismiss the action with
prejudice. Id. at 94, 308 S.E.2d at 664. The court stressed that although the trial court's dismissal
was discretionary, the Schell case illustrated the type of case that "justifies the extreme sanction of
a Rule 41(b) dismissal." Id. See infra note 44. Judge Hill authored the decision and was joined
by Judges Becton and Johnson.
9. Record at 2, 4, Jones.
10. Id. at 3. Jones alleged that he was placed in a prison mental health ward and kept on
medication from the date of his incarceration in June 1976 until his discharge from the ward in
October 1978. Id. at 2-3. Jones further alleged that defendant knew of this mental treatment and
medication but nevertheless advised him to withdraw his appeal of the murder conviction in September 1976 and to sign a consent judgment settling a wrongful death suit instituted by the decedent's survivors. Jones alleged that defendant's advice to settle the wrongful death action was
"not in plaintiff's best interest but rather. . . for his own personal gain." Id. Jones allegedly was
under medication and psychiatric care at the time of the settlement. Id. at 3.
Defendant denied knowledge of Jones' alleged medication and impaired abilities. He maintained that Jones voluntarily dropped his appeal "against advice of counsel." Furthermore, defendant alleged that Jones asked him to seek a settlement of the wrongful death action. Jones
allegedly wanted defendant to pay off Jones' creditors and his legal fees, and establish a trust fund
for plaintiff's son with the balance of his estate. Id. at 4.
11. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
12. The rule 41(b) motion to dismiss was filed Sept. 10, 1981. Record at 6-7, and Jones'
motion to amend his complaint was filed Oct. 1, 1981. Id. at 10.
13. Id. at 13-14.
14. The court of appeals' decision was written by Judge Whichard. Judges Arnold and Hill
joined him.
15. Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 2-3, 306 S.E.2d at 801. The law firm of Petree, Stockton, Robinson, Vaughn, Glaze & Maready, primarily through partner W.F. Maready, represented plaintiff,
Shirley Harris, in domestic matters against her husband Roger Harris. Id. William H. Petree, a
partner in the firm, and Roger Harris were involved in independent business transactions and
Shirley Harris alleged that this created a conflict of interest. Id. at 3, 306 S.E.2d at 801. She sued
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million dollars and punitive damages of five million dollars. 16 Unlike the trial
court in Jones, however, the trial court in Harrisdenied defendant's motion to
dismiss' 7 and allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint.' 8 In an opinion written by Judge Braswell, t 9 the court of appeals reversed and held that "the trial
judge abused his discretion by failing to allow the defendants' motion to dis20
miss for a violation of rule 8(a)(2)."
Harris'factual setting, although substantially similar to that in Jones, dif-

fered in one significant respect: the flawed complaint was filed by a licensed
attorney rather than an inmate appearing pro se. Furthermore, by holding

that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to dismiss, the Harris
court established that involuntary dismissal for violations of rule 8(a)(2) is

mandatory rather that discretionary. 2 ' Because the court in Harrisspecifically
adopted the reasoning in Jones and held that it was dispositive of the issue of

sanctions for rule 8(a)(2) ad damnum violations, 22 an analysis of Jones is
the law firm and joined Maready and Petree as individual codefendants. Id. at 2, 306 S.E.2d at
807.
16. Id. at 15, 306 S.E.2d at 807.
17. Id. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808.
18. Id. at 15, 306 S.E.2d at 808. Interestingly, the attempt to amend the complaint also was
mishandled. Although the offending parts of the prayer for relief were corrected, the two adjacent
paragraphs labeled "Damages" were not altered. Thus, the amended complaint still contained a
request for $5,000,000 in both general and punitive damages in apparent contravention of rule
8(a)(2). Id. at 15, 306 S.E.2d at 807. The court of appeals decided not to address this alleged
pleading error or assign it any weight. Instead, the court simply held that the trial judge abused
his discretion by refusing to grant defendants' motions to dismiss. See id. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808.
Harris' attorney contended that the 8(a)(2) limitation did not apply to these paragraphs. First, the
action was not "purely and simply a 'professional malpractice action.'" Appellant's North Carolina Supreme Court Brief at 26. Second, plaintiff alleged that the 8(a)(2) limitation related exclusively to the ad damnum clause in the complaint and the offending paragraphs were not in that
clause, which had been corrected. Id. at 26-27.
19. Judge Webb dissented concerning the holding of abuse of discretion, see supra note 7.
Judge Arnold concurred on that issue and dissented regarding the court's dismissal for failure of
service of process. Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 17, 306 S.E.2d at 808-09.
20. Harris,64 N.C. App. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808.
21. See, e.g., id. While the court limited its decision with the phrase "on the facts before us,"
the underlying message in Harris is clear: violations of the professional malpractice section of
rule 8(a)(2) will be treated harshly. It is significant to note that there is no indication in Harrisor
Jones that the mistakes were made in bad faith. If the court of appeals imposes a dismissal of a
suit in its entirety "on the facts" in Harris and Jones, it is difficult to postulate a fact pattern to
which the sanction would not apply. Thus, the practical effect of Harris andJones is a rule mandating involuntary dismissal. See infra note 45-46 and accompanying text.
22. Harris,64 N.C. App. at 15, 306 S.E.2d at 808. The court noted that Jones was the first
appellate case interpreting the rule 8(a)(2) damage restrictions and sanctions for violation thereof,
although the court of appeals had foregone one other opportunity to rule on sanctions for violations of rule 8(a)(2) in Thigpen v. Piver, 37 N.C. App. 382, 246 S.E.2d 67, disc. rev. denied, 295
N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978). In Thigpen the court dismissed the case under rule 41(d), which
provides for dismissal with prejudice when a plaintifftakes a voluntary dismissal in a prior action
and then institutes a new action on the same claim against the same defendant without paying the
costs of the original action. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(d). Thus, the Thigpen court did not reach the
8(a)(2) issue. Thigpen, 37 N.C. App. at 388, 246 S.E.2d at 70.
Thigpen involved a medical malpractice suit in which plaintiff sought $500,000 in damages.
The trial judge applied a subjective good faith test to deny defendant's motion for an involuntary
dismissal. The court concluded that "there was no intention on the part of either the plaintiff or
his attorney to violate the provisions of Rule 8." Record at 30, "higpen. Judge Small also declared as a matter of law that "[r]ule 8 does not provide for a mandatory dismissal by reason of the
failure to comply with its provisions." Id.
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imperative.
In Jones the court noted that, according to the Report of the North Carolina ProfessionalLiability Insurance Commission,23 the 1976 amendment to
rule 8(a)(2), limiting damage clauses in malpractice actions, was the General
Assembly's "response to a perceived crisis in the area of professional liability
insurance." 24 The court also observed that the legislative purpose of the damage clause restriction, as defined by the Insurance Report, was to "avoid adverse press attention prior to trial, and thus save reputations from the harm
which can result from persons reading about huge malpractice suits and drawing their own conclusions based on the money demanded. '25 Interestingly,
this report referred only to medical malpractice suits; the reputations of attorneys and other professionals were not mentioned. 26 The Jones court reasoned
that, although rule 8(a)(2) provides no sanctions for its violation, "the General
23. REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMMISSION
(March 12, 1976) (available in University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Law Library) [hereinafter cited as INSURANCE REPORT]. The professional malpractice amendment to rule 8(a)(2) was

enacted two months after this report, during the 1975 General Assembly's second session. Act of
May 12, 1976, ch. 977, 1976 N.C. Sess. Laws 3. The General Assembly chose to limit the damage
clause to a jurisdictional amount ($10,000) rather than proscribe all mention of damage amount.
See N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
24. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300 (dictum). Senator Tom Suddarth filed a
minority report that challenged the existence of a medical malpractice crisis in North Carolina
and alleged that the actual insurance problem existed in other states as a result of high malpractice
awards in those states. INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 23, pt. II, at 4-5 (Minority Report), Because there is no recorded legislative history, discerning the legislators' intentions is problematic.
25. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300 (quoting INSURANCE REPORT, sWra note
23, at 33), quoted in Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808; Schell v. Coleman, 65 N.C.
App. 91, 93, 308 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1983).
Newspaper articles detailing Jones' suit, including the amount of damages sought, appeared
in both of Raleigh's major newspapers two days after Jones fied his suit. See Raleigh News and
Observer, Aug. 15, 1981, at 23, col. 1; Raleigh Times, Aug. 15, 1981, at 5-B, col. 6. Much lengthier
articles detailing the legal malpractice claim in Harris,including the damages sought, appeared in
the Winston-Salem papers after Mrs. Harris filed her suit. See Winston-Salem Journal, Feb. 4,
1982, at 12, col. 1; Winston-Salem Sentinel, Feb. 3, 1982, at 23, ol. 5. Copies of the WinstonSalem articles are included in the Harris record. Record at 29-30, Harris.
26. See, e.g., INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6 ("[T]he malpractice dilemma. . . began to surface in North Carolina in 1974. . . . St. Paul was the principal malpractice insurer in
North Carolina, underwriting policies for over 90% of the physicians and surgeons practicing in
the state as well as 75 hospitals."); id. at 13 ("the crisis created by the lack of availability of
medical malpractice insurance has abated"); id. at 25 ("[P]ortions of the following analysis have
been reprinted from 'A Legislator's Guide to the Medical Malpractice Issue.' ").
No mention is made in the report of anything other than the needs ofpnedical malpractice
insurers. Furthermore, the statutes mentioned in the report, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.009(1) (West
1980) and TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-117 (1980), are limited to medical malpractice claims. The
Wisconsin medical malpractice statute is cited in the Jones opinion. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587,
299 S.E.2d at 300. Therefore, if the General Assembly enacted the rule 8(a)(2) addamnum restriction on the basis of either the INSURANCE REPORT or the Wisconsin Statute, or both, then it is
arguable that the rule was intended to apply only to medical malpractice, but was artfully drafted
to include all professional malpractice.
In her brief to the North Carolina Supreme Court, plaintiff in Harris also has raised the
argument that singling out of professionals as a group is unconstitutional. Appellant's North Carolina Supreme Court Brief at 30-31, Harris. Indiana, however, has a statute similar to the North
Carolina statute. It excludes mention of any dollar amounts in medical malpractice claims, IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-6 (Burns 1983), and the Indiana Supreme Court has held that this statute
neither violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States or Indiana constitutions, nor the free speech and writing provisions of the Indiana Constitution. Johnson v. St.
Vincent, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 604-05 (Ind. 1980).
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Assembly... must have intended application of the 41(b) power of dismissal" because "absent application of the Rule 41(b) [sanction] . . . , litigants

could ignore the proscription with impunity, thereby nullifying the express
legislative purpose for its enactment." 27
The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected similar reasoning in
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.28 In Surowitz the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had affirmed a rule 41(b) involuntary dismissal

on the grounds that failure to impose sanctions for violations of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23 (now rule 23.1) would destroy the effect of the
rule.2 9 The Supreme Court rejected that rationale and articulated the policy

30
consideration underlying modem pleading rules.

The basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice

through fair trials, not through summary dismissals as necessary as
they may be on occasion. These rules were designedin largepart to
get awayfrom some of the oldproceduralbooby traps which commonlaw pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticatedlitigantsfrom ever

having theirday in court. If rules of procedure work as they should in
an honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but should
as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried

to an adjudication on the merits. Rule 23(b), like the other civil
27. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300. Despite this assertion, a New York court
rejected involuntary dismissal as too drastic in an analogous situation. In Pizzingrilli v. Van Kessel, 100 Misc. 2d 1062, 420 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1979), plaintiffs included demands for $1,500,000 and
$1,000,000 in a medical malpractice suit. Id. at 1066-67, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 543-44. Defendants
moved to dismiss the counts in question pursuant to a New York statute that prohibits any statement of money damages in medical malpractice cases. Id. at 1066, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 542. See N.Y.
Civ. PRAc.LAW § 3017(c) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). The court rejected defendants' motion:
Defendant hospital contends that the third and fourth causes of action (in connection with which specific sums are demanded as damages) should be dismissed because
they violate the mandates of Section 3017(c). So drastic a remedy as this appears unauthorized by CPLR 3017(c). Motions for relief pursuant to CPLR 3017(c) . . . are
designed to correct pleadings, rather than to dismiss them.
Pizzingrilli, 100 Misc. 2d at 1065, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 542. Rather than dismissing the action, the
court ordered that the offending portions of the addamnum clause be stricken and that plaintiffs
serve an amended pleading. Id. at 1067, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
28. 383 U.S. 363 (1966). Surowitz involved a shareholder derivative suit brought under FED.
R. Civ. P. 23 (current version at FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1), which required that the complaint be
verified by oath. Mrs. Surowitz, a Polish immigrant with a limited educational background and
virtually no English language skills verified the complaint as it was explained to her by her son-inlaw, an attorney. Upon oral examination Mrs. Surowitz was unable to demonstrate any understanding of her complaint, and Judge Hoffman dismissed the suit with prejudice for her violation
of rule 23. The court of appeals affirmed. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (1965),
rev'd, 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
29. Surowitz, 383 U.S. at 372-73 n.5. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit had held that for rule 23 to have any effect, a minimum requirement that plaintiff have a
general understanding of the complaint was not unreasonable. The Supreme Court rejected the
court of appeals' rationale. Id.
30. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) ("It is... entirely contrary to the spirit of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such
mere technicalities"); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("The Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the
outcome and accept the principal purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits.").
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rules, was written to further, not defeat the ends of justice. 3 1
Rules 8 and 15 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure recognize

the policy articulated in Surowitz. 32 Rule 8 parallels FRCP 8 and requires
only "notice pleading," 33 rather than the complex machinations required

under code pleadings. Rule 15 parallels FRCP 15;34 it demands that leave to
amend after a responsive pleading is filed be "freely given where justice so
requires." 35 Nevertheless, North Carolina rule 41(b), which is identical to
FRCP 41(b),36 expressly authorizes a court to dismiss a suit with prejudice if

the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules. 37 The issues presented in Jones and
Harris were: How should these conflicting rules and policies be balanced, and

impose dismissal, the harshest penalty
at what juncture should the 3courts
8
available for pleading errors?
The Jones and Harris courts both glossed over these fundamental ques-

tions, and instead focused on the narrower issue of whether the trial court
abirsed its discretion in granting the rule 41(b) motion to dismiss. 39 The two

opinions contained only one sentence on this policy question that arises whenever the trial court dismisses an action on a pleading technicality.40 By emphasizing the discretionary nature of the court's power to allow or deny rule
41(b) motions to dismiss, 4 1 the court of appeals avoided the question of the
31. Surowitz, 383 U.S. at 373 (emphasis added). Although the presumption favoring trial on
the merits is not absolute, it is strong and not easily overcome. Coupling North Carolina rule
8(a)(2) with an automatic sanction of involuntary dismissal should be characterized as a "booby
trap" under the Surowitz language.
32. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 8, 15.
33. N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). This rule requires only a "short and plain statement" that puts all
parties and the court on notice.
34. Gro-Mar Pub. Relations, Inc. v. Billy Jack Enters., 36 N.C. App. 673, 678, 245 S.E.2d
782, 785 (1978) ("[Elxcept for differences in time allotments ... Rule 15(a) of the North Carolina Rules is identical to its federal counterpart.").
35. N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
36. See Joyner v. Thomas, 40 N.C. App. 63, 65, 251 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1976).
37. N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(b) ("[fIor failure of the plaintiff. . . to comply with these rules. . .a
defendant may move for dismissal.").
38. See 5 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FED. PRACTICE 41.12 (1982). The
fundamental issue-whether a plaintiff should lose his cause of action because of pleading errors-is identical in Jones and Harris. The two cases, however, differ in one crucial aspect. Jones
involved a complaint filed by apro se layperson, see Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300,
while the improper complaint in Harris was filed by an attorney. See Record at 52, Harris.
39. See Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808; Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d
at 299.
40. That sentence, which was located in Jones, was:
While leave of court 'shall be freely given when justice so requires,' G.S. IA-I, Rule
15(a), and while justice might often so require where a layman appearing pro se inadvertently fails to conform to technical legal requirements, judicial discretion may properly be exercised to subordinate these concerns to readily discernible countervailing
legislative intent.
Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300 (citations omitted). In a similar setting, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the use of such reasoning to give force to a federal rule regarding
pleading procedure. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
41. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300. See Mumford v. Hutton & Bourbonnais
Co., 47 N.C. App. 440, 445, 267 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1980). Defendant in M'umford alleged that
plaintiff had failed to properly state a claim for relief. The court allowed plaintiff the opportunity
to amend, which plaintiff declined, and the court then dismissed the case with prejudice.
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intent and purpose of the rule 15(a) admonition to grant leave to amend when

justice so requires. Because rule 41(b) provides the discretionary power to
grant such dismissals, 42 the court held that no abuse of discretion occurred in
Jones.43 In Harris, however, the court of appeals failed to explain why the
44
trial court's refusal to dismiss was an abuse of discretion.

By choosing the harshest available sanction, the court of appeals ignored
two alternative analyses, either of which would have resulted in a better rule

of law. First, the court could have examined the cases in light of the clear
North Carolina policy favoring freely granted amendments to cure defective

pleadings. Second, even if the court felt a need to impose a sanction for violation of rule 8(a)(2), the court could have selected a less harsh penalty to ensure

that parties who "inadvertently fail to conform to technical legal requirements" 4 5 do not lose potentially valid causes of action. Either of these alterna-

tives would reflect more properly the underlying premise of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure "that decisions be had on the merits and

not avoided on the basis of mere technicalities.

'46

The first, alternative analysis indicates that the court of appeals decisions
in Harrisand Jones run counter to the policy favoring liberal amendment of
pleadings. Although North Carolina courts have stressed repeatedly that rule
15(a) is to be construed liberally, 47 the trial judge has discretion to permit or
deny the offered amendments. 48 The trial judge's discretion, however, is not
42. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
43. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587-88, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
44. See Harris,64 N.C. App. at 15-16, 306 S.E.2d at 807-08. If the power truly is discretionary, the court of appeals should have articulated the nature of the abuse of discretion that justified
reversal. Subsequently, in Schell v. Coleman, 65 N.C. App. 91, 308 S.E.2d 662 (1983), the court
ineffectively attempted to articulate its standard for abuse of discretion:
The court's holdings in these cases [Jones and Harris]do not dictate that a court
must dismiss an action if there is a Rule 8(a)(2) violation. The Rule 41(b) power of
dismissal is only a permissible sanction, not a mandatory one. Allowance of a motion to
dismiss on the basis of a Rule 8 motion is discretionary with the court . . . . But as
illustrated by Harris, an abuse of discretion may be found if the court denies a motion to
dismiss when there was a flagrant violation of the rule.
Id. at 94, 308 S.E.2d at 664. The Schell trial court had rejected defendant's motion for dismissal,
but ordered plaintiff to amend his prayer for relief, which plaintiff failed to do. Id. at 92, 308
S.E.2d at 663.
Although the court of appeals asserted that a 41(b) dismissal with prejudice for 8(a)(2) violations is a discretionary sanction in both its opportunities to review 8(a)(2) decisions, the court
reversed the trial judge's discretionary ruling that the complaint be amended rather than dismissed. In addition, this standard of discretion apparently is related to whether the damage
amounts improperly sought were reported in the news media; the court stressed that the print and
radio media reported the specific damage claims in Schell. Id, at 94, 308 S.E.2d at 664-65. The
damage requests in both Jones and Harriswere published in local newspapers. See supra note 25.
45. Jones, 60 N.C.App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
46. Mangum v. Surles, 281 N.C. 91, 99, 187 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1972) (offered amendment
sought to conform the pleadings to the evidence under rule 15(b)).
47. See Vernon v. Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 654, 231 S.E.2d 591, 596 (1977) (dictum); Mangum v.
Surles, 281 N.C. 91, 98-99, 187 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1972); Roberts v. William N. and Kate B. Reynolds Memorial Park, 281 N.C. 48, 56, 187 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1972); Watson v. Watson, 49 N.C. App.
58, 60, 270 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1980).
48. See Saintsing v. Taylor, 57 N.C. App. 467, 471, 291 S.E.2d 880, 883, disc. rev. denied, 306
NC. 558, 294 S.E.2d 224 (1982); Gladstein v. South Square Assocs., 39 N.C. App. 171, 177, 249
S.E.2d 827, 830 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 736, 254 S.E.2d 178 (1979); Willow Mountain
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unlimited. The supreme court has held that the trial court should allow the
amendment "unless some material prejudice is demonstrated.

'4 9

Although

the trial judge's discretion is reversible only on a showing of abuse,5 0 it has
been held that denying a motion to amend without both a justification and a

showing of prejudice to the defendant is an abuse of discretion. 5 '
The only prejudice cited by the Jones and Harris courts was the possible

harm to defendants' reputation if a large malpractice claim were reported in
the news.5 2 No prejudice inheres in merely amending a flawed complaint to
make it comply with 8(a)(2); the damage to defendants' reputation is not cured
by denying leave to amend and dismissing the suit. The only other possible
prejudice is indirect-higher malpractice rates.5 3 This prejudice also arises
from media publication of the suit and not the motion to amend. Since analysis of the Jones and Harris motions to amend reveals no undue prejudice to
defendants, the court of appeals should have reversed the trial court in Jones
for failure to grant leave to amend and should have affirmed the trial court's
grant of leave to amend in Harris.
The second, alternative analysis indicates that the court of appeals erred

when it chose involuntary dismissal rather than a less harsh penalty. Rule
Corp. v. Parker, 37 N.C. App. 718, 719-20, 247 S.E.2d 11, 12 ("extensive discretion"), disc. rev.
denied, 295 N.C. 738, 248 S.E.2d 867 (1978); Forbes v. Pillmon, 18 N.C. App. 439, 440, 197 S.E.2d
226, 227 (1973) ("broad discretion"); Helson's Premiums & Gifts, Inc. v. Duncan, 9 N.C. App.
653, 657, 177 S.E.2d 428, 431 (1970) ("broad discretion").
49. Mangum v. Surles, 281 N.C. 91, 98-99, 187 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1972). See also Vernon v.
Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 654, 231 S.E.2d 591, 596 (1977) (dictum---"the burden is on the party objecting to the Amendments to show that he would be prejudiced thereby"); Gladstein v. South
Square Assocs., 39 N.C. App. 171, 177, 249 S.E.2d 827, 831 (1978) ("at the time of plaintiff's
motion to amend to correct technical defects in her complaint, defendant would have suffered no
discernible prejudice") disc rev. denied, 296 N.C. 736, 254 S.E.2d 178 (1979); vanDooren v.
vanDooren, 37 N.C. App. 333, 337, 246 S.E.2d 20, 23 ("the motion should be allowed unless its
allowance would impose a substantial injustice upon the opposing party"), disc. rev. denied, 295
N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 258 (1978).
50. See Rogers v. Rogers, 39 N.C. App. 635, 636, 251 S.E.2d 663, 664 (1979).
51. Ledford v. Ledford, 49 N.C. App. 226, 271 S.E.2d 393 (1980). Ledford, relying on the
Supreme Court's holding in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), held that "the trial judge
abuses his discretion when he refuses to allow an amendment unless a justifying reason is shown
....
The burden is on the objecting party to show that he would be prejudiced thereby." Ledford, 49 N.C. App. at 233, 271 S.E.2d at 398-99.
52. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 200 S.E.2d at 300; Harris,64 N.C. App. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at
808 (quoting Jones). Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals in Jones mentioned any
undue delay, bad faith, or other improper behavior by plaintiff; the court of appeals acknowledged Jones' "inadvertent" failure to satisfy the restrictions of rule 8(a)(2). Jones, 60 N.C. App. at
587, 299 S.E.2d at 300. Furthermore, no references to improper behavior are cited in Harris. The
attorney who filed the improper complaint admitted that he did not know that rule 8(a)(2) applied
to legal malpractice actions. Record at 52, Harris. Cf.supra note 26.
Rule 8(a)(2) implicitly assumes that a newspaper article which states that a professional has
been sued for $3,000,000 causes more damage to his reputation than an article which states that he
has been sued for damages "in excess of$10,000." At best, however, the relative magnitude ofthe
loss of reputation is speculative. Arguably, the damage done to reputation, in whatever amount,
results from the public report that the "professional" is being sued for malpractice and not the
magnitude of the damages demanded. The court of appeals, however, accepted the INSURANCE
REPORT's "harm to reputation" theory, supra note 25 and accompanying text, without debate.
Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
53. See Note, Medical Productsand Services Liability.- Public Policy Requires Legislative Innovation and JudicialRestraint, 53 DEN. L.J. 387, 403 (1976).
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41(b) authorizes dismissal with prejudice in three circumstances. Failure to
comply with the rules, which was the justification for dismissal in the Jones
and Harris cases, is only one of the permissible grounds for dismissal. The
other two grounds, failure to prosecute and failure to comply with orders of
the court,54 define more serious wrongdoing than the inadvertant pleading errors in Harrisand Jones. Generally, the courts have been reluctant to dismiss

cases falling in these two categories. The North Carolina and federal cases
addressing sanctions for these offenses reflect the courts' efforts to apply less

harsh penalties absent either evidence of intentional misconduct or such im-

proper behavior that the court may infer deliberate abuse.55

For example, in the leading North Carolina case involving dismissal for
failure to prosecute, the court of appeals reversed a dismissal, holding that
"[d]ismissal [under 41(b)] for failure to prosecute is proper only where the
plaintiff manifests an intention to thwart the progress of the action to its conclusion."'56 The court derived its intent standard from the seminal United
States Supreme Court case of Link v. WabashR.R. 57 The Link Court signaled

its unwillingness to enforce a dismissal with prejudice absent clear proof of
deliberate dilatoriness. 58 Courts generally have imposed sanctions for failure
to comply with a court order because such behavior implies a conscious or
intentional failure to act. 59 Logically, violations of the rules of the court
54. N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(b). See supra note 2 for text of rule 41o(b).
55. North Carolina's rule 41(b) is identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b), see supra note 36 and
accompanying text, and federal cases, therefore, are apposite. See, e.g., Mangum. v. Surles, 281
N.C. 91, 97, 187 S.E.2d 697, 701 (1972) (federal decisions apposite because N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(b)
virtually identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b)); Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 98-99, 176 S.E.2d 161,
163 (1970) (federal decisions that rule 12(b) motion to dismiss is modem equivalent of commonlaw demurrer apposite because N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b) is virtually a verbatim copy of federal rule
12(b)).
56. Green v. Eure, 18 N.C. App. 671, 672, 197 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1973). Plaintiff in Green
failed to take action for two years because he misunderstood the court calendaring procedure.
The court emphasized the need for evidence "that the plaintiff had been deliberately proceeding
in dilatory fashion." Id. (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). See Jones v. Stone,
52 N.C. App. 502, 505, 279 S.E.2d 13, 15 (citing Green with favor; "the record does not suggest
that petitioner deliberately proceeded in dilatory fashion"), disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C. 195, 285
S.E.2d 99 (1981); see also Barbee v. Walton's Jewelers, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 760, 253 S.E.2d 596
(citing Green with favor; dismissal upheld when neither plaintiff nor attorney offered explanation
for failure to appear when case called for trial), disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 608, 257 S.E.2d 435
(1979); Thompson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 24 N.C. App. 577, 211 S.E.2d 526 (1975) (same
facts and holding as Barbee).
57. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
58. The dismissal in Link was granted only after a six-year delay, two continuances, and a
failure of counsel to appear at pretrial conference. Id. Although the Court adopted an agency
theory to justify penalizing the client for her attorney's errors, the Court stressed that the attorney's actions were deliberate and that several opportunities to proceed were afforded plaintiff and
counsel. Id. at 633-34, 636. See also Chandler Leasing Corp. v. Lopez, 669 F.2d 919, 920 (4th Cir.
1982) (rule 41(b) dismissal by North Carolina federal district court for "sloppy" failure to retain
local counsel held too drastic a sanction.); see infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
59. See Hyler v. Reynolds Metal Co., 434 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970) (dismissal proper when
plaintiff did not comply with court order to file amended complaint), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 912
(1971); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.) (failure to amend complaint within 20 days as
ordered), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964). For a discussion of 41(b) dismissals in the federal
courts, and the willingness of the courts to consider any reasonable excuse in order to avoid invol-
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should be analyzed in the same manner, i.e., a showing of deliberate abuse
should be required before severe sanctions are applied.
Violators of rule 8(a)(2) can be categorized as follows: (1) the layperson
who files apro se complaint without any knowledge of the pleading rule and
errs inadvertently; 60 (2) the attorney who either is unaware of the rule or is
unaware that the vale applies to his case;61 and (3) the attorney who intentionally violates the rule to damage the defendant's reputation or incite sensational
media coverage to increase his reputation and fees, in contravention of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. 62 An evaluation of these categories of
violators reveals that even if a penalty was deemed necessary, the court of
appeals should have chosen a less severe remedy than involuntary dismissal.
The first and easiest category to analyze is thepro se plaintiff. In Haines
v. Kerner63 the United States Supreme Court held that a court should not
dismiss summarily a complaint, especially apro se complaint, unless "it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.' "64 The court of appeals acknowledged this policy favoringpro se litigants in Jones, yet still dismissed his case
without any evaluation of the merits of his case. 65 Penalizing the pro se
layperson by dismissing his suit with prejudice directly contravenes this policy.
The typical pro se inmate, however, cannot be punished effectively in any
other manner because he usually is judgment-proof, not subject to censure or
ethical sanctions, and incapable of paying costs or attorneys' fees. One possible solution is to apply a "good faith" test topro se litigants, dismissing their
untary dismissals, see R. RODEs, K.

RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 32-44 (1981).

North Carolina courts have upheld the application of severe sanctions for violating discovery

orders or rules. See Laing v. Liberty Loan Co., 46 N.C. App. 67, 264 S.E.2d 381 (answer stricken
and default judgment granted for failure to produce documents), disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 557,
270 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Silverthorne v. Coastal Land Co., 42 N.C. App. 134, 256 S.E.2d 397 (dismissal when plaintiff failed to answer interrogatories), disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 300, 259 S.E.2d
302 (1979). It is worth noting that these dismissals are under rule 37(b)(2) and 37(d) and that the
intentional nature of the action warrants such severe penalties. The parties in these cases had the
opportunity to proceed and chose not to do so. Furthermore, unlike rule 8(a)(2), the power to
dismiss is provided specifically within rule 37. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), 37(d).
60. See Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300. Jones is a fairly typical example of
such a plaintiff-a prison inmate dissatisfied with his conviction and claiming that his attorney
failed him.
61. See Record at 52, Harris. Harris' attorney informed the court that he was "unaware that
Rule 8(a)(2) was applicable to an action against an attorney and further, because the Complaint
contained other separate claims, that [he believed] such Rule was not applicable." Id.
62. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980). Ethical
Consideration 7-25 specifies that an attorney "is not justified in consciously violating such rules [of
evidence and procedure]." Id. at EC 7-25.
63. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
64. Id. at 521 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)), quoled in Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978). The Gordon court also
held that, "[w]hat might be a meritorious claim on the part of apro se litigant unversed in the law
should not be defeated without affording the pleader a reasonable opportunity to articulate his
cause of action." Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1152.
65. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300 (1983) ("justice might often so require
[leave to amend] where a layman appearing pro se inadvertently fails to conform to technical

legal requirements.").
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suits with prejudice only upon a showing of intent to flaunt the rule.66 In all

other cases, courts should grantprose litigants leave to amend their pleadings
to conform to the rule. A good faith standard would give the court leverage to

dismiss in cases of willful violations, but would ensure preservation of potentially valid causes of action when the error is inadvertent.
The second and third categories of potential 8(a)(2) violators-unwitting

and unscrupulous attorneys-may be considered together. A more fundamental question underlies the issue of what sanctions to apply to these violators:
should a client be punished for the errors of his attorney? 67 In ChandlerLeasing Corp. v. Lopez 68 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed a dismissal with prejudice for violation of a local rule of court 69 and
adopted a test. The court "must ascertain (1) the degree of personal responsibility of the plaintiff, (2) the amount of prejudice caused the defendant ....
and [(3)] the existence of a sanction less drastic than dismissal."70 The addi-

tion of a fourth criterion-the existence of clear evidence that the attorney
deliberately included a specific damage clause despite knowledge of rule

8(a)(2)-would create a proper test for attorneys who misfile damage claims in
malpractice suits.
The existence of viable lesser sanctions is a critical factor. Sanctions less
drastic than dismissal with prejudice include conditional dismissal,7t assessment of attorneys' fees, fines against the attorney, assessment of costs, and

dismissal without prejudice. 7 2 Any of these lesser sanctions, or a combination

of them, should be levied against the attorney who filed the improper complaint, 73 absent the unlikely possibility that the client intended that the com66. See Green v. Eure, 18 N.C. App. 671, 672, 197 S.E.2d 599, 600-01 (1973) (plaintiff must
show deliberate intent before dismissal is proper); 5 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, supra note
38, 41.12 ("[w]here, however, a reasonable excuse is offered for failure to comply with a rule or
order, the court should. . . either refuse to dismiss, or provide in its order of dismissal that it does
not constitute an adjudication upon the merits"); R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, supra note
59, at 32-44.
67. See generally R. RODEs, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, supra note 59, at 70-79. Although the
courts have adopted a general agency analysis to hold the client responsible for the attorney's
failure to prosecute, see Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (dismissal only after six
years of inaction, two continuances, and a failure to appear at pretrial conference), Rodes, Ripple
and Mooney do not cite a single case in which a 41(b) dismissal with prejudice has been a sanction
for a violation of a pleading technicality under the federal rules. See R. RODEs, K. RIPPLE & C.
MOONEY, supra note 59, at 30-41.
68. 669 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 920. The local rule required that out-of-state counsel retain local counsel. Plaintiff
received three requests to comply before Judge Dupree dismissed the complaint.
70. Id. (citing Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 69-70 (4th Cir. 1978)). The court reversed the
dismissal, holding that although there was evidence of "sloppiness," dismissal of an action with
prejudice was too drastic a sanction for mere carelessness.
71. See N.C.R. Ctv. P.41(b). Rule 41(b) was rewritten to "make clear that the court's power
to dismiss on terms, that is, to condition the dismissal ... extends to all dismissals other than
voluntary dismissals under section 41(a)." Id.
72. See Lopez, 669 F.2d at 921.
73. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This rule allows the Court to place the potential cost of frivolous
or unsubstantiated claims on the attorney. For a general treatment of the growing policy favoring
the award of punitive attorneys' fees for attorney misconduct, see Mallor, PunitiveAttorneys' Fees
for4buses of the JudicialSystem, 61 N.C.L. REv. 613 (1983).
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plaint violate the rule.74 Furthermore, the court should file an automatic
complaint with the State Bar Association's disciplinary committee. Although
one such complaint might not, and probably should not, lead to disciplinary
action, it would create a record of improper conduct. Subsequent complaints
for the same violation would indicate intentional abuse and could be treated
more harshly.
It is significant to note that the limitation on ad damnum clauses contained in rule 8(a)(2) is of little practical value in stopping intentional abuse of
the rule75 because it is defeated so easily. To circumvent the purpose of the
rule articulated by the Jones and Harriscourts, 76 an unprincipled lawyer need
only file a malpractice complaint alleging large specific compensatory and punitive damages, then immediately contact the press as to the nature of the suit
and the amount of relief demanded. Then, without leave of court, he could
amend the complaint to conform to the 8(a)(2) damage limitations. Because
an efficient attorney or layperson easily could accomplish all of this in one or
two days, the defendant would rarely, if ever file a responsive answer early
enough to stop the plaintiff from amending his complaint as of right under
rule 15(a). 77 The result is a sensationalized claim that cannot be dismissed
78
involuntarily with prejudice under the rule created by Jones and Harrs.
A procedural remedy for the foregoing scenario exists, but was not employed in the Jones or Harrisproceedings. Once a plaintiff filed a complaint
that contained an 8(a)(2) violation, even if amended as of right before a responsive pleading were filed, the court could order all proceedings stopped to
determine whether the violation was intentional.7 9 If the pretrial investigation
revealed purposeful conduct on the part of the plaintiff or his counsel, the
judge then would be warranted in either penalizing the attorney or dismissing
the case with prejudice.80 Once again, the four-prong test articulated above s
74. If the client knew of or encouraged the violations, or intentionally selected the attorney

because he wanted such a complaint filed, the court should dismiss the action with prejudice
under rule 41(b).
75. What difference could it possibly make as to the amount Mrs. Harris says she's been
damaged? If such a rule were valid, why not a law that says you can't put in a pleading
the "bad" things the "professional" did. . . or you can't tell who the "professional" is,
requiring all suits against attorneys to be against "John Doe?" The rule itself is absurd.
Enforcement by dismissal of a violative complaint would be a travesty.
Appellant's North Carolina Supreme Court Brief at 31, Harris.
76. The stated purpose was to stop publication of large damage claims to protect the reputations of professionals. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
77. N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that a party may amend once, as of right, if the amendment is made prior to a responsive pleading.
78. The unscrupulous attorney intent on circumventing the stated purpose of rule 8(a)(2) has
at least one other alternative: file a complaint that meets 8(a)(2)'s requirements but have his client
tell the media what amount of damages are sought. This alternative has the added advantages of
preserving the one amendment plaintiff has as of right under N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a) as well as
cleansing the attorney of obvious rule manipulation. These rule-defeating procedures are not
offered as suggestions to practitioners, but to point out that rule 8(a)(2) is inadequate because it is
so easily defeated.
79. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966).
80. Id.

81. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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should be used to evaluate the validity of such a harsh sanction.
Application of the good faith test forpro se laypersons and the four-part
test for attorneys, when coupled with the suggested procedural mechanism,
would allow courts to punish willful abuses while providing less harsh sanctions for those who err inadvertently. Only the person responsible for the error-usually the attorney-would be penalized; his client's potentially valid
causes of action would be preserved.
The rule of law established by the holdings in Jones v. Boyce and Harrisv.
Maready is unjust and should be repudiated by the North Carolina Supreme
Court. The Harris rule-requiring dismissal of a plaintiff's potentially valid
claim at an early pretrial stage in circumstances when the defendant would
suffer no damage if the complaint were amended-contradicts North Carolina's strong policy favoring trial on the merits, 82 and is particularly inappropriate when applied to pro se litigants. The Jones and Harris decisions have
created a code-like pleading trap for the unwary, unversed and incompetent
that snares the innocent and lets the guilty go free.
JOHN REID PARKER, JR.

82. See Vernon v. Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 654, 231 S.E.2d 591, 596 (1977); see also supra note 46
and accompanying text.

